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Abstract 
 Implementing event-study analysis, I find that President Trump’s tweets about publicly 
traded companies cause daily abnormal returns of 0.25% in a company’s stock in the same 
direction as the sentiment of the tweet: positive tweets increase abnormal returns by 0.25% on 
the day’s end, while negative tweets will cause -0.25% abnormal returns.  
Additionally, I find that President Trump’s company-specific tweets increase the daily 
abnormal trading volume and volatility of a company’s stock by 19%, regardless of tweet 
sentiment. For abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume, the effects of President Trump’s 
tweets do not last multiple days after a tweet. However, company stocks experience persistent 
higher volatility up to four days after President Trump tweets about them.  
When breaking the sample into subsets, I find that President Trump’s positive sentiment 
company-specific tweets have an asymmetrically stronger impact on a company’s abnormal 
returns and abnormal trading volume than that of negative sentiment company-specific tweets. 
For most measures, President Trump’s Twitter influence increases greatly when he tweets about 
a company during U.S. market trading hours. Outlier robust regressions confirm that the main 
abnormal returns results are not driven by outliers, while the results for volume and volatility 
appear to be inflated by outliers. 
Because this type of stock market influence causes persistent increased volatility and has 
potential to be abused, I recommend that lawmakers consider limiting the scope of presidents’ 
ability to tweet about publicly traded companies. 
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Introduction 
 In the past decade, social media has evolved into both a form of personal expression and 
a mode of reporting real-time news. Millions of Twitter users every day look to friends, 
celebrities, and influencers for news and opinions. As social media occurs in real-time, it should 
be no surprise that it correlates to financial markets, which also operate in real-time.  
President Trump coming into a position as one of the most important people in the world 
during the dawn of worldwide social media usage provides ample opportunities to study how 
social media plays a role in the world and, in particular, the stock market. On July 1, 2017, 
President Trump tweeted “My use of social media is not Presidential - it’s MODERN DAY 
PRESIDENTIAL.” As he said himself, Donald Trump’s embrace of social media as a world 
leader is truly modern and unprecedented; he has tweeted over 16,000 times since becoming 
President-Elect on November 9, 2016 — much more than any other world leader. 
Because President Trump is so unique in his Twitter usage as President of the United 
States, his tweets have already been the subject of a number of studies including two that 
highlight his effect on the U.S. stock market. The first of these studies, by Juma’h and Alnsour 
(2018), focused on how President Trump’s tweets affect the U.S. stock market on a broader level 
by evaluating tweets containing key financial or economic terms, while also considering how his 
tweets about specific companies effected the stocks of those companies. Ge, Kurov, and Wolfe 
(2018) studied specifically how President Trump’s tweets about publicly traded companies affect 
the abnormal returns, abnormal trading volume, volatility, and Bloomberg institutional investor 
attention of those companies’ stocks. 
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To better understand President Trump’s (apparent) influence over stocks, consider an 
instance when he tweeted (from @realDonaldTrump) about Google on August 19, 2019 at 
exactly 11:52 a.m. EST.:  
Wow Report Just Out! Google manipulated from 2.6 million to 16 million votes for 
Hillary Clinton in 2016 Election! This was put out by a Clinton supporter not a Trump 
Supporter! Google should be sued. My victory was even bigger than thought! 
@JudicialWatch 
This tweet is clearly negative towards Google, as President Trump suggests that the company be 
sued for potentially meddling in the 2016 election. In the immediate moments after this tweet, as 
depicted in the graph below, the stock price (red line) of Google (ticker = GOOGL) dropped 
significantly, and the volume (blue bars) skyrocketed.  
It can be argued that, in this particular instance, President Trump was not the sole driver 
of Google’s total day stock price and volume swings; surely, the subject matter of the news 
report played a role in the movement of Google’s stock over the course of the entire day. Keep in 
mind, however, that the report that President Trump references was released earlier in the 
morning well before President Trump’s tweet. Therefore, the specific timing of Google’s stock 
price and volume movements shows how, at the very least, President Trump contributed to the 
intraday movements of Google’s stock price and volume. In the matter of two minutes after 
President Trumps’ negative tweet, the price of Google dropped $4 and the volume increased by 
about 26,000 more trades than the prior two minutes. 
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Motivated to understand President Trump’s Twitter influence in a comprehensive manner 
and clear up the divisive results between Juma’h et al.’s and Ge et al.’s studies, I will be 
replicating Ge et al.’s study, excluding the “Bloomberg institutional investor attention” variable 
that they included in their analysis. From there, I will run tests on an extended within-sample 
time period to incorporate more of President Trump’s company-specific tweets during his 
presidency. Finally, using this expanded sample data, I will conduct numerous sensitivity 
analyses to extract as many insights into President Trump’s Twitter influence as possible.  
 
 
 
11:52 
Kleczka  6 
Literature Review 
A number of behavioral finance research studies have explained the link between Twitter 
sentiment and the stock market on a large scale (over a million tweets evaluated). Ranco et al. 
(2015) show that tweet sentiment polarity peaks about a particular stock imply the direction of 
cumulative abnormal returns for that stock. In other words, when numerous people are tweeting 
strong sentiments about a company, the stock price of that company will move in the direction of 
the sentiment of those tweets: positive tweets imply gains in stock prices, while negative tweets 
imply decreases in stock prices. Similarly, Li et al. (2018) analyzed over 1.2 million tweets that 
incorporated specific hashtags of publicly traded companies. They found that periods of high-
volume strongly-positive tweets about a company signify positive daily abnormal returns, but 
that relationship does not hold at an intraday level (15-minute intervals). This suggests that it 
takes the course of an entire trading day for public Twitter sentiment about a company to be 
reflected in the abnormal returns of the company’s stock. 
Another large-scale study regarding Twitter sentiment and the stock market was 
conducted by Nofer and Hinz in 2015. These researchers hypothesized that the Twitter sentiment 
of an entire area reflects the mood of the investors of that area, and the mood of investors 
impacts stock market returns. Instead of attempting to test this hypothesis on a global scale, 
Nofer and Hinz focused on Germany and its stock market index, the DAX. Twitter mood was 
determined by key-word identification using the WAST method, detailed in their paper. They 
found that, when weighting tweets by follower count, social mood is predictive of returns in the 
DAX and these returns last until the end of the next trading day (the end of the day after tweet 
mood is determined). 
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Less research into the link between Twitter sentiment and the stock market exists at the 
microeconomic level. Shutes et al.’s (2016) study shows how popular financial microbloggers 
often cause abnormal returns for stocks they tweet about. Specifically, they found that these 
microbloggers, such as @Scaramucci and @dougkass, cause statistically significant changes in 
daily abnormal returns of stocks they tweet about 29.7% of the time. Sul, Dennis, and Yuan 
(2014) demonstrate results consistent with Ranco et al. (2015) and Li et al. (2018), with an 
additional key insight: tweets by users with larger follower counts have a stronger impact on 
changes in abnormal returns than tweets by users with lower follower counts. Logically, this 
makes sense, as the information disseminated by users with many followers will reach a wider 
audience. 
My research covers one of the most-followed tweeters in the world, Donald Trump, and 
investigates how he alone may impact the stock market, much like a financial microblogger. The 
two closest related papers to my research have been briefly mentioned in the Introduction. 
Juma'h and Alnsour (2018) collected a sample of President Trump’s tweets containing economic 
or financial keywords as well as tweets about publicly traded companies. Then, they 
implemented interday event-study analysis to determine what effects President Trump’s tweets 
have on major U.S. stock market indexes and the specific companies he tweets about. They 
found that President Trump has no effect on the performance of U.S. indexes nor the companies 
he tweets about. 
Contrary to Juma'h and Alnsours’s (2018) results, Ge et al. (2018) show that President 
Trump’s company-specific tweets do have significant effects on daily abnormal returns, 
abnormal trading volume, and volatility of company stocks he tweets about. The potential driver 
of the difference between Juma'h and Alnsour’s results and Ge et al.’s results could be the fact 
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that Juma'h and Alnsour included company-specific tweets from the beginning of 2016 — well 
before President Trump was elected president. Meanwhile, Ge et al. focused specifically on 
President Trump’s company-specific tweets from the time of his election, November 9, 2016, 
through July 31, 2017. Considering the contradictory results, this suggests that investors are not 
motivated to base decisions off of Donald Trump’s tweets himself, but, rather, are driven to 
make decisions off the sentiment of tweets of the person holding the title President of the United 
States. In other words, I conjecture that a person’s position of power is more relevant to his/her 
social media stock market influence than the person himself or herself.  
 Ge et al. (2018) serves as the basis of my own research. I seek to replicate their study, 
then build upon their research with a larger sample of tweet events and new methods.  
 
Data Collection 
To begin, I searched the Trump Twitter Archive for instances in which President Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump) tweeted the name of a publicly traded company between November 9, 
2016 and December 31, 2019. As the name implies, the Trump Twitter Archive is a data 
repository of all of Donald Trump’s tweets. The final sample included 257 company-specific 
tweet observations. Included in this sample are tweets about a subsidiary of a publicly traded 
company. Tweets about subsidiaries are evaluated based on changes in the stock of the parent 
company. For example, on July 11, 2019 President Trump tweeted a positive sentiment about 
Sikorsky, an aircraft manufacturing company. Because Sikorsky is owned by Lockheed Martin, a 
publicly traded company, this tweet was treated as if it were directed at Lockheed Martin.  
A number of company-specific tweets were excluded from this sample. Following Ge et 
al.'s precedent, tweets about major media conglomerates, such as The New York Times, Sinclair 
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Broadcast Group, and Tribune Media were excluded. This decision stems from President 
Trump’s complicated relationship with “the media”; the attention that President Trump brings to 
these media companies, regardless of sentiment, is linked to each company’s revenue, as 
increased attention increases advertisement viewership. This relationship muddles the intended 
research area of this study, especially considering that tweets about mass media conglomerates 
make up an overwhelming majority of all his company-specific tweets.  
Tweets directed at companies that are not traded on U.S. exchanges were also excluded, 
as American investors — presumably the majority of people basing investment decisions off of 
President Trump’s tweet sentiment — generally lack consistent access to foreign exchanges or 
over-the-counter financial markets. Additionally, instances in which President Trump retweeted 
tweets that include the name of a publicly traded company, or when he himself tweeted a 
picture/logo of a publicly traded company, were also excluded. Furthermore, tweets that include 
the name of a company coincidentally are excluded from the sample. An example of a tweet 
excluded for this reason is the following tweet from October 8, 2019:  
I think that Crooked Hillary Clinton should enter the race to try and steal it away from 
Uber Left Elizabeth Warren. Only one condition. The Crooked one must explain all of her 
high crimes and misdemeanors including how & why she deleted 33000 Emails AFTER 
getting “C” Subpoena! 
Despite the capitalization of “Uber,” in this context the word clearly functions as an adjective 
describing the extremity of Elizabeth Warren’s democratic views, as opposed to referencing the 
ride-sharing company. 
 Every instance in which President Trump tweeted about a country, a dummy variable 
representing the tweet, “TW,” was assigned a non-zero number on the market trading day for the 
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corresponding company stock. Positive tweets were given a “1” on the dummy variable, and 
negative tweets were given a “-1.” For days in which President Trump did not tweet about a 
company, the dummy variable was “0.” Tweets during U.S. market trading hours (9:30 a.m. - 
4:00 p.m. EST) were simply assigned to the TW variable on day of the tweet. Tweets after-
market trading hours were assigned to the TW variable on the next trading day, as investors 
looking make decisions based off these tweets would only be able to do so the next time they are 
able to make trades. Often, President Trump tweets about a particular company multiple times 
within hours or even minutes of each other. When multiple tweets are supposed to be assigned to 
the same date, the Twitter dummy variable does not change to reflect these occurrences, as a 
dummy variable cannot be scaled up or down to indicate the number of occurrences. Rather, the 
unscaled dummy variable captures the effects of multiple tweets assigned to the same day: in 
theory, the changes to abnormal returns, abnormal trading volume, and volatility should 
compound to reflect multiple tweet occurrences. In other words, if President Trump tweets 
negatively about Google twice on the same day, his effect on Google’s stock should (in theory) 
double. This conjecture was tested, and the results are explained in Section VIII of the Results. 
Considering the instance of multiple tweets assigned to the same day, the total number of “tweet 
events” in my sample —all the times a dummy variable was assigned to a trading day — is 209. 
This number results from 34 instances in which multiple tweets were assigned to the same 
trading day.  
The final sample included these 209 tweet events, spanning 57 companies and 790 days, 
Three companies, Andeavor, Aetna, and Time Warner Cable have shortened estimation windows 
because they were delisted before the end of the estimation period. Altogether, this amounts to 
44,052 total panel observations. 
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 The chart below depicts the publicly traded companies that received the most tweet 
events. In this sample, Amazon is the top recipient of President Trump’s attention with 26 tweet 
events — ten more than the second most-frequently tweeted company, Twitter. President Trump 
has often criticized Amazon for exploiting the Federal Post Office system. Additionally, 
President Trump has taken issue with Amazon’s connection to the Washington Post, one of 
many “Fake News” entities that he has warred with. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The technique used to investigate how an individual could influence stocks is called 
“event study analysis”, which is the overarching method of this research. See Khotani and 
Warner (2007) and Binder (1997)  for a broader explanation of event-study analysis and its 
various facets. My specific event study analysis requires daily closing, opening, high, and low 
stock prices along with daily total volume: this data came from Bloomberg.  
An additional component of my event study analysis is broad stock market data, required 
for abnormal returns calculations. The Fama-French 3-factors, the standard for most event study 
analyses, were used as the broad-market controls in this study, and this data came directly from 
Company Ticker Total Tweets
Amazon AMZN 26
Twitter TWTR 16
Facebook FB 14
General Motors GM 14
Google GOOGL 12
Ford F 10
Apple AAPL 10
Most Tweeted Companies
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Fama and French’s official website. These variables will be explained in more detail in the 
Methodology. 
 
Sentiment Classification 
As mentioned in the Data Collection Section, tweets are assigned to a corresponding market 
trading day as a positive or negative one on dummy variable, “TW.” In the most general form, 
the sentiment of each tweet is determined by the tone expressed by President Trump towards the 
company mentioned in that tweet. Sentiment was determined by myself because the tweet 
sample was manageable enough for detailed analysis of context and content of each tweet. This 
serves to reduce errors that come from computer-programmed textual analysis, which cannot 
effectively account for tweet context. General guidelines to determining President Trump’s 
company-specific tweet sentiment were set by Ge et al. (2018): 
1. Tweets regarding a company potentially creating (decreasing) jobs in the US are 
classified as positive (negative). This includes instances in which President Trump 
reports that a specific building, factory, facility, or business segment will remain 
operating in the U.S., close permanently, or move to another country. 
2. Tweets regarding a company costing the US government money are classified as 
negative. 
3. Tweets about companies incurring losses due to the Affordable Care Act are graded as 
negative. 
4. Tweets about meetings with CEOs are graded as positive. 
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My sentiment classification procedure follows the aforementioned guidelines by Ge et al. and 
lays out additional guidelines necessary for classifying tweets that did not fall under their  
standards. These additional guidelines are as follows: 
5. Accusing a company of propagating “Fake News” discredits that company for poor 
journalistic practices (even if the news is not actually “fake”). Therefore, President 
Trump’s accusations of a company promoting “Fake News” are graded as negative 
towards that company. Amazon, with its connection to the Washington Post, has 
frequently been a recipient of these accusations. Conversely, instances where President 
Trump lauds as a company for eliminating “Fake News” are graded positive, considering 
that the company appears to be taking action to improve its journalistic practices. 
6. Tweets concerning silenced conservative voices from a platform are graded as negative 
toward the company of that platform for similar reasons to Guideline #5. 
o Example: A tweet from May 3, 2019 
The wonderful Diamond and Silk have been treated so horribly by Facebook. They 
work so hard and what has been done to them is very sad - and we’re looking into. 
It’s getting worse and worse for Conservatives on social media! 
o This tweet is graded as negative towards Facebook 
7. Thanking a company for a particular action is graded positively. 
8. Mentioning a company-sponsored arena is a positive sentiment toward that company. 
o Example: A tweet from October 15, 2019  
Join me in Dallas, Texas (October 17th) at the American Airlines Center! 
#KAG2020 
o This tweet is graded as positive towards American Airlines 
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o Rationale: President Trump’s willingness to participate in events in a company-
sponsored arena suggest that he passively accepts what the company stands for. 
Furthermore, these tweets are a form of free advertising for the company, which 
reflects positively on that company. 
9. References to a company in regards to a particular tool or platform are graded positively 
for reasons similar to that of Guideline #9. 
o Example: A tweet from September 9, 2017 
FLORIDA- Visit FloridaDisaster.org/info to find shelters road closures & 
evacuation routes. Helpful Twitter list … 
o Twitter, offering a helpful list feature, is graded as positive in this example. 
10. If President Trump reports on positive (negative) news about a company, the tweet is 
graded positively (negatively).  
o Example: A tweet from November 1, 2019 
Wow a blowout JOBS number just out adjusted for revisions and the General 
Motors strike 303000. This is far greater than expectations. USA ROCKS! 
o General Motors is graded as negative in this example. 
o Rationale: In this particular example, President Trump is reporting on positive 
news: great jobs number. However, his reference to the GM strike reminds his 
followers that GM has been undergoing issues with its labor force, which, before 
revisions, would negatively impact the jobs numbers.  
11. Tweets regarding a company suffering from tariffs are classified as negative because it is 
implied that the company will lose (or has lost) profits. Tweets about a company avoiding 
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tariffs by maintaining business operations in the US are graded as positive for the same 
reasons as Guideline #1 . 
o Example: A tweet from July 26, 2019  
Apple will not be given Tariff waiver or relief for Mac Pro parts that are made in 
China. Make them in the US no Tariffs! 
o This tweet is graded as negative towards Apple. 
12. Instances where President Trump condemns a company for not paying adequate taxes to 
the U.S. government are graded as negative for reasons similar to Guideline #2. 
o Example: A tweet from March 29, 2018 
I have stated my concerns with Amazon long before the election. Unlike others, 
they pay little or no taxes to state and local governments… 
o This tweet is graded as negative towards Amazon. 
 
Methodology 
I. Abnormal Returns 
The steps for determining daily abnormal stock returns are as follows. First, I find the excess 
returns (ERit) of company “i” at day “t.” Excess returns are defined as the daily returns (“R”) of a 
stock,  R𝑖,𝑡 =  
C𝑡−C𝑡−1
C𝑡−1
   , subtracted by the Risk Free alternative (RFt), where “C” stands for daily 
closing price. RFt is a component of Fama-French 3 factors and stands for the one-month 
Treasury Bill rate.  
The excess returns are calculated for a pre-sample period (January 1, 2016 through 
November 8, 2016) and within-sample period (November 9, 2016 through December 31, 2019) 
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for all stocks in the sample. The pre-sample excess returns are regressed on Fama-French’s 3-
Factor model components: 
ERi,t = β0 + β1(RMt − RFt) + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εi,t 
Where, εi,t represents the error component of the regression. RMt represents the market return for a given day, 
specifically, the returns of all companies represented in the NASDAQ and NYSE exchanges. SMBt represents the 
difference between small and big market capitalization stocks performance. HMLt stands for the difference in high 
and low book-to-market ratio stock performance. RMt, RFt, HMLt, and SMBt are defined in detail in Fama & French 
(1993). 
The beta coefficients from the pre-sample ER regression are used to calculate abnormal returns 
(AR) for each company in the within-sample period. The pre-sample betas are used for within 
sample calculations to prevent event returns from influencing the measures of normal returns 
(Mackinlay, 1997). Within-sample abnormal returns are calculated as follows: 
ARi,t = ERi,t − [β0 + β1(RMt − RFt) + β2SMBt + β3HMLt] 
Finally, the abnormal returns for each stock over the within-sample time period (the period 
containing the 209 tweet events graded and assigned to the TW dummy variable) are used in a 
fixed effects panel model: 
1) ARi,t = 0 + 1TWi,t + i + υi,t 
where i accounts for the company-specific fixed effects and υi,t is an error component of the regression. 
The coefficient on TW is the main object of focus for most parts of this research, as it explains 
how abnormal returns of a company are affected (if at all) by President Trump’s tweets about 
that company.  
 
 
 
Kleczka  17 
II. Abnormal Trading Volume 
To estimate President Trump’s Twitter impact on a company’s trading volume, first, a 
company’s five-day average trading volume (V𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑖,𝑡) is calculated:   V𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑖,𝑡 =  
∑  V𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑗
1
𝑗
 ,  where 
“j” equals 5. Using the five-day average controls for intraweek trading fluctuations. The 
abnormal trading volume (ATV) calculation is as follows: ATV𝑖,𝑡 =  
V𝑖,𝑡−V𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑖,𝑡
V𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑖,𝑡
  . Finally, a fixed 
effects panel model is estimated in which ATV is regressed on the absolute value of TW. 
Consistent with past literature, the rationale for using the absolute value of TW stems from the 
concept that, regardless of tweet sentiment, the trading volume will increase. Logically, those 
basing decisions off of President Trump’s tweets will react with increased buying or increased 
selling, which both lead to increased trading volume. The fixed effects panel model looks as 
follows: 
2) ATVi,t = 0  + 1|TWi,t |+ θi + i,t 
Where, θi represents company-specific fixed effects and i,t  represents the error term. 
 
III. Volatility 
Following Ge et al.’s method, I chose to calculate a company’s daily variance using Rogers 
and Satchell’s (1991) range-based calculation: 
2i,t  =  (Hi,t – Ci,t)*(Hi,t – Oi,t)  +  (Li,t – Ci,t)*(Li,t – Oi,t) 
Where Hi,t stands for a company’s highest trading price of the day, Ci stands for the closing price,, Li,t stands for the 
lowest price of the day, and Oi,t stands for opening price. 
To express volatility in percentage terms, I take the square root of 2i,t and multiply it by 
100. Finally, this volatility variable is regressed in a fixed effect panel model equivalent similar 
to regression 2:  
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3) Volatilityi,t = 0  + 1|TWi,t |+ i + i,t 
Where i  represents individual company fixed effects and i,t represents the error component of the regression. 
 
IV. Other Considerations 
As researchers Beck and Katz point out in a 1994 paper, a number of issues arise with OLS 
fixed effects models that deal with cross-sectional time series data. Particularly, cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity distorts true standard errors of coefficient estimates. Therefore, my regression 
results will be expressed using Beck and Katz’s method of correcting standard errors of panel 
data, unless otherwise stated.  
Because the coefficient on the TW variable is the most-important part of each regression, the 
corresponding null and alternative hypotheses of importance are H0 : 1 = 0 and H1 : 1 ≠ 0. The 
coefficient from the AR regressions is illustrated here as an example, but the coefficient on TW 
is the important consideration for all three regressions (AR, ATV, and Volatility). When the 
coefficient on TW is significant to at least the 10% level, the null hypothesis can be rejected, and 
thus, President Trump’s company-specific tweets have a proven impact on companies’ AR, 
ATV, and/or Volatility. 
Below are summary statistics of the full sample abnormal returns, abnormal trading 
volume, and abnormal volatility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ER AR ATV Volatility
Min -0.271 -0.293 -0.862 0.071
Median -0.005 -0.005 -0.064 1.014
Mean -0.005 -0.005 0.042 1.198
Max: 0.197 0.193 17.352 14.587
Summary Statistics
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Results 
I. Replication of Ge et al. 
To begin, I attempted to replicate the major findings of Ge et al.’s research. The results of the 
my replication study compared to Ge et al.’s findings are depicted in Table 1 of the Appendix. 
These tests were estimated based on the fixed effects panel model described in the Methodology. 
Both samples contains the same 34 tweet events about 19 companies that total 3,439 panel 
observations.  
The results of my replication test nearly identically matched those of Ge et al’s study. Both 
results show that a positive (negative) tweet about a company causes an increase (decrease) in a 
company’s abnormal returns by about 0.6%. This is economically meaningful when considering 
that a 0.6% change in stock price could amount to hundreds of million dollars in changes to that 
company’s market capitalization. Additionally, both tests show that President Trump’s company-
specific tweets increase ATV by about 33% and volatility by about 20%. 
 
II. Analysis with Full Sample 
The same methods described in the Methodology and implemented in the replication study 
were applied to the expanded sample of panel data spanning 209 tweet events (257 total tweets), 
57 companies (3 with shortened estimation windows), and 790 days, totaling 44,053 panel 
observations. The results of these tests are depicted in the first row of Table 2 of the Appendix. 
It appears that, within this 790 day sample period, President Trump’s company-specific 
tweets still carry power to them, causing a 0.25% increase (decrease) in daily abnormal returns 
when a tweet about a company is positive (negative). Additionally, ATV and volatility remain 
strongly influenced by President Trump’s tweets: both measures increase by about 19% when 
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President Trump tweets about a company. Although these results are all lower in magnitude than 
the results of Ge et al.’s study, they are still economically significant for the same 
aforementioned reasons.  
There are a number of potential explanations as to why President Trump’s Twitter 
influence seems to have weakened in comparison to Ge et al’s study. Firstly, President Trump’s 
company-specific tweets may have lost their novelty in the public eye as people grew more 
accustomed to seeing him tweet as President of the U.S. Secondly, people may have lost trust in 
President Trump’s words and/or sentiments. PolitiFact, a non-partisan group that grades 
verifiable claims made by prominent American politicians, reports that, as of April 19, 2020, 
69% of 796 graded claims of President Trump were “Mostly False,” “False,” or “Pants on Fire” 
(outlandishly false). Certainly, the public could have grown tired with the President’s copious 
amount of false claims, and correspondingly lost trust in the veracity of his Twitter sentiments. 
With this in mind, my results capture a broader, more accurate representation of President 
Trump’s Twitter influence, accounting for more total tweets and a longer time period in which 
investors were able to become more acclimated to his Twitter behavior.  
 
III. Testing for Asymmetry  
To decompose more specific effects of President Trump’s tweets, a number of tests were 
performed with restricted samples of the Twitter dummy variable, TW. First, the fixed effect 
panel regressions described in the Methodology were conducted on only the 103 positive tweets 
(with the same 44,053 total panel observations). The results in second row of Table 2 show that 
positive tweets correspond to a statistically significant 0.42% change in abnormal returns, which 
is about 0.17% higher than the results of the full sample test. President Trump’s positive tweets 
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also cause higher changes in ATV and lower changes to volatility compared to the full sample 
results. 
This same process was repeated on the 106 negative tweets in the sample, and the results are 
also shown in Table 2. Notice how the coefficient on TW in the AR test lost its significance. 
Whereas Ge et al. (2018) found no significant difference in market reactions to positive and 
negative tweets, my results suggest that there is a difference: it appears that investors are not as 
strongly driven to base investment decisions off negative company-specific tweets as they are to 
base investment decisions off positive company-specific tweets. 
 All the aforementioned tests included tweets that were tweeted after market trading hours 
and assigned to the next day under the assumption that these tweets would affect stock trading 
the next time trading is available. I believe that the effect of tweets not after market trading hours 
would have a weaker effect on abnormal returns, abnormal trading volume, and volatility, 
because investors are more likely to forget about President Trump’s tweets when they have to 
wait a period of time before making trades. Therefore, I hypothesize that tweets during market 
hours (what I will call “intraday tweets”), when investors reacting to tweets can immediately 
make trades, would have a stronger effect on stock the three stock variables of interest. The 
regression to test this hypothesis is different from the others in that only intraday tweets were 
given a “1” or “-1” for the Twitter dummy variable, and the rest were given a “0.” Altogether, 
there were 64 intraday tweet events. The results are depicted in the Table 3 of the Appendix. 
ATV and volatility are higher magnitudes in this test than the full sample test, which partially 
confirm my conjecture. Contrary to my conjecture, however, the coefficient on the AR variable 
was not significant, which suggests that, in general, President Trump’s intraday tweets have no 
effect on stock’s abnormal returns. 
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 I surmise that the lack of significance on the AR variable could derive from asymmetries 
between effects of positive intraday tweets compared to negative intraday tweets. So, I 
conducted tests on subsets of positive (28) and negative (36) tweets. These results are depicted in 
the bottom two rows of Table 3. Considering the highly significant value of  0.8% on the AR 
variable in the positive only intraday tweet test and the non-significant value on the TW 
coefficient in the negative intraday tweet regression, it does appear that asymmetries exist in the 
effects of President Trump’s intraday tweets. 
 
IV. Time-Based Interaction Effects 
I found it important to investigate how President Trump’s influence may have changed 
between different time periods. The regressions that I constructed have a slightly different 
structure than those described in the Methodology: 
ARi,t = 0 + 1TWi,t + 2Ii,t +  3(TWi,t *Ii,t) + i + υi,t 
ATVi,t = 0  + 1|TWi,t |+ 2Ii,t + 3(|TWi,t |*Ii,t) + θi + i,t 
Volatilityi,t = 0  + 1|TWi,t | + 2Ii,t + 3(|TWi,t |*Ii,t)  i + i,t 
 Where, Ii,t represents a dummy variable for a time period and the last two variables of 
each regression represent company fixed effects and error terms, respectively. The coefficients 
on (TWi,t *Ii,t) represents the interactions effect; in other words, this coefficient shows how (if at 
all) a tweet during a particular time period affects the magnitide of President Trump’s Twitter 
influence.  
The first time period I decided to test was the difference between tweets from Ge et al.’s 
sample and my full sample. Remember, Ge et al.’s sample contains President Trump’s 31 
company-specific tweet events from November 9, 2016 through July 31, 2017. My sample 
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covers 209 company-specific tweet events from November 9, 2016, through December 31, 2019. 
The aforementioned regressions were implemented with the inclusion of a “1” on the “I” dummy 
variable for days in the panel occurring after this July 31, 2017.  
The results of this test are depicted in the first row of Table 4. There is no statistical 
significance for the coefficients of the interaction effects on AR and Volatility, suggesting that 
President Trump’s Twitter influence did not change between my sample and Ge et al.’s for these 
two variables. However, the coefficient on ATV significantly increases by 7% when a tweet 
occurs during the Post-Ge et al. time period. This result suggests that investors actually began 
paying more attention to President Trump’s tweets over the time period of August 1, 2017 
through Dec 31, 2019. Perhaps this result is driven by an increase in President Trump’s Twitter 
followers and press coverage in that period. 
 Additionally, I decided to test for a difference before and after President Trump’s 
inauguration. Following the previously described interaction effect methodology, a “1” was 
given to panel observations after Trump’s inauguration (January 20, 2017) and assigned to the 
“I” variable. The results of these interaction effect regressions are represented in the bottom row 
of Table 4. These results show that President Trump’s influence on abnormal returns in the post-
inauguration period are much lower than that of his pre-inauguration period. In the Literature 
Review, I surmised that investors are more likely to make decisions when a person, such as 
Donald Trump, attains more power than they normally do. These results suggest that my 
conjecture is not necessarily true, as President Trump had a higher influence on stocks before he 
was inaugurated, which was before his presidency (and the power that comes with it) officially 
began. 
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V. Tweets as Reaction to Related News 
Ge et. al (2018) used Factiva to determine which of President Trump’s tweets are a reaction 
to “related news” and which are “original” in content. They determined that 19 out of 34 tweets 
were reactions to related news and the rest were original. Then, they found that the original 
tweets cause changes to AR and volatility that are greater in magnitude than the effects of his 
tweets in reaction to related news. 
I find that determining what counts as “related news” and what does not is a blurry line: on 
Factiva, one can find “news” about nearly any large company on nearly any day, and trying to 
link this news to the content of President Trump’s tweets can be complicated. This research 
paper is more interested in confirming or rejecting the idea that President Trump’s tweets could 
be a reaction to related news than it is interested in trying to determine asymmetric effects 
between related news tweets and original tweets. To accomplish the task of identifying whether 
or not President Trump’s tweets are generally a reaction to related news, I tested the Twitter 
dummy variable as if it were tweeted by President Trump one through five days earlier, and 
regressed this in a fixed effects panel model: 
ARi,t = 0 + 1TWi,t + 2TWi,t-1 + 3TWi,t-2 + 4TWi,t-3 + 5TWi,t-4 + 6TWi,t-5 + i + i,t 
ATVi,t = 0 + 1|TWi,t |+ 2|TWi,t-1 |+ 3|TWi,t-2 |+ 4|TWi,t-3 |+ 5|TWi,t-4 |+ 6|TWi,t-5 | + i + i,t 
Volatilityi,t = 0 + 1|TWi,t |+ 2|TWi,t-1 |+ 3|TWi,t-2 |+ 4|TWi,t-3 |+ 5|TWi,t-4 |+ 6|TWi,t-5 |+ i + i,t 
Where the last two variables of each regression represent company fixed effects and an error component, 
respectively. 
The outcome of these tests are shown in Table 6 of the Appendix. The significant coefficients 
on the one-day lag suggests that, indeed, there is some sort of event, or “news,” that influences a 
stock the day before Trump tweets about that stock. This does not affect the rest of the 
interpretations of my research, as it can be argued that these “news” events are fully incorporated 
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into a stock’s price by the following day, as per the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970). 
Therefore, the significant coefficients on Trump’s tweets on the day of the tweet suggest that 
Trump’s tweets themselves are new “news” that elicits a market response. 
 
VI. Persistence of President Trump’s Twitter Effects 
The findings up until this section show the power that President Trump wields over 
company’s stock abnormal returns, abnormal trading volume, and volatility over the single day 
in which investors are able to make trades off his tweets. However, it may be that President 
Trump’s influence lasts more than a single day. To test this, I set up a model similar to that of 
Section V, except with the Twitter variable placed each of five days after the tweet event. These 
regressions look as follows: 
ARi,t = 0 + 1TWi,t + 2TWi,t+1 + 3TWi,t+2 + 4TWi,t+3 + 5TWi,t+4 + 6TWi,t+5 + i + i,t 
ATVi,t = 0 + 1|TWi,t |+ 2|TWi,t+1 |+ 3|TWi,t+2 |+ 4|TWi,t+3 |+ 5|TWi,t+4 |+ 6|TWi,t+5 | + i + i,t 
Volatilityi,t = 0 + 1|TWi,t |+ 2|TWi,t+1 |+ 3|TWi,t+2 |+ 4|TWi,t+3 |+ 5|TWi,t+4 |+ 6|TWi,t+5 |+ i + i,t  
Where the last two variables of each regression represent company fixed effects and an error component, 
respectively. 
The results of these tests are shown in Table 5. The coefficients for both AR and ATV show 
no significance in the days following President Trump’s company-specific tweets; this suggests 
that the effect of President Trump’s company-specific tweets does not last more than a day, for 
these two variables. The coefficient on volatility, however, is statistically significantly for up to 
four days after a tweet, which suggests that President Trump’s company-specific tweets cause 
persistently high volatility in the company’s stocks. Peculiarly, the coefficient on the two-day lag 
isn’t significant in the volatility regression while the coefficients on the three and four-day lag 
variables are significant. In case these strange results came from outliers, I conducted M-
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Estimation on the volatility regression using the method described in the next section. The test 
results did not clear up the peculiar findings regarding volatility. 
  
VII. Robust Regressions 
To make sure that the results of my main findings are not driven by outliers, all the tests of 
Section I were redone with the Huber method of M-Estimation (also known as Outlier Robust 
Estimation). This method fits a model using iterated re-weighted least squares, weighting 
observations with low residuals higher than observations with high residuals. These regressions 
do not incorporate panel-corrected standard errors, as the estimation method does not allow for 
correcting of cross-sectional heteroscedasticity (Ge et al., 2018). 
The results of the M-Estimation are reported in Table 7. Abnormal returns are nearly 
unchanged by outliers compared to the full sample results of Table 2. However, ATV and 
volatility are 6% and 13%, respectively, compared to the results of 19% each for the full sample; 
it appears that these two variables are inflated in magnitude by outliers. Additionally, the outlier 
robust regressions performed on the positive and negative tweet subsets all seem to be strongly 
influence in magnitude and/or significance by outliers. 
As an alternative robustness test, two-way fixed effects regressions were implemented to 
control for each company and day in the panel data. Controlling for time-based effects is 
somewhat redundant, as the method of calculating abnormal returns already controls for time-
based effects that impact the entire stock with the use of the Fama-French 3 factors. However, 
there is still value in the time-based control variables, as non-stock market events could influence 
any given day of trading, and the abnormal trading volume and volatility variables do not have 
market-wide controls built into their calculations. 
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The two-way fixed effects tests follow the same structure as the one-way fixed effects 
described in the Methodology, with the addition of dummy variables for each of the 790 days of 
the estimation period. The results of these tests are shown in Table 8. We see that the results are 
nearly equivalent to those of the one-way fixed effects regressions. 
 
VIII. Tests that Yielded No Significant Results 
With a large sample size of company-specific tweets events and companies, 209 and 57, 
respectively, it was possible to conduct tests that could elucidate more detailed insights into 
President Trump’s Twitter influence. Unfortunately, all of these tests that I will describe yielded 
no significant insights. However, the lack of significant results of these tests is a result of itself: 
President Trump’s Twitter influence on company’s stocks is universal and not limited to 
particular situations, company characteristics, or tweet interactions. 
I began by creating dummy variables for each company based on market capitalization. I 
expected to find that President Trump’s company-specific tweets have greater influence over 
small cap stocks – companies with under $2 billion market capitalization. Smaller cap stocks are 
generally traded less than any other cap size, and I figured that President Trump’s action of 
bringing these companies to the limelight would create massive swings in all measures, relative 
to stocks with larger market capitalizations. To my surprise, the tests did not support this 
hypothesis: it appears that market cap of a company does not change how President Trump’s 
company-specific tweets impact abnormal returns, abnormal trading volume, and volatility of 
stocks.  
Similarly, I thought there would be insights extracted from fixed effects regressions with 
interaction effects tested for the sectors of each company. I categorized each company based on 
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its sector listed in its company profile on Yahoo Finance. I believe that the Sector-based 
interaction effects yielded no significant results due to many sectors having very few Twitter 
events assigned to them, such as the Utilities sector which only had on one company and two 
tweet events in the sample.  
Additionally, I hypothesized that President Trump’s approval rating would reflect the 
public’s trust in his word, and, thus, reflect how strongly investors would react to his company-
specific tweets. Specifically, I expected that President Trump’s tweets when he had an approval 
rating above his median (as of December 31, 2019) would have a stronger impact on stocks than 
tweets below the median. Approval rating data was collected by FiveThirtyEight, which averages 
approval ratings from numerous pollers and adjusts the data based on political bias, poll quality, 
and sample size. Likewise, I thought that tweets above the median amount of interactions 
(favorites and retweets) would correspond to higher magnitude abnormal stock movements. 
Fixed effects regressions yielded no significant results for interaction effects for instances in 
which President Trump tweeted about a company while having an above median approval rating, 
above median favorites, or above median retweets. 
In the Introduction, I mentioned that instances when multiple company-specific tweets were 
assigned to the same company on the same day, President Trump’s effects would compound on 
those particular days. This was tested using the regressions of the Methodology on a subset of 
“multiple tweet instances” as a replacement for TW. A “1” was given to this variable for days 
with multiple positive tweets assigned to them. A “-1” was assigned to days when multiple 
negative tweets were targeted at a company. There were no instances that had one or more 
positive tweets and one of more negative tweets occurring on the same day. Additionally, I 
expected tweets that occurred over the weekend, which were assigned to the next trading day 
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(usually a Monday or Tuesday) would have weaker results because investors lack access to 
financial markets and would be more likely to forget about the tweet by the next time they trade. 
To my surprise, these results of “multiple tweets” and “weekend tweets” subset tests remained 
consistent with my full sample results, showing that President Trump’s company-specific Twitter 
influence is not withheld to any particular timing. 
 
Conclusions 
Firstly, this study successfully replicates Ge et al’s (2018) results, showing that their 
work is to be trusted and valued. Additionally, this paper expands on the work of Ge et al. by 
extending the sample size of tweets and trying new types of sensitivity analyses that unveil 
insights into the ways in which President Trump exhibits power over the stocks of publicly 
traded companies that he tweets about. I find that, in general, when President Trump tweets 
positively (negatively) about a company, he will create positive (negative) abnormal returns in 
that company’s stock of 0.25% by the end of the trading day. Similarly, whenever President 
Trump tweets about a company, regardless of sentiment, he increases the abnormal trading 
volume and volatility of that company’s stock by about 19%. Furthermore, I find that positive 
tweets have an asymmetrically stronger impact on stocks than negative tweets. The effects of 
President Trump’s tweets on a company’s AR and ATV do not last more than one day, while the 
effects on volatility last up to four days. 
 This paper also adds to the general literature of social media event-study sentiment 
analysis. There is now more evidence that individuals alone, particularly ones of high power and 
prestige like a president, are alone able to affect the stocks of publicly traded companies worth 
billions of dollars. 
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For active investors seeking to profit, the results of this research can impact investment 
decisions. A prudent investor would consider monitoring President Trump’s tweets and buying 
(shorting) shares of a mentioned company that he tweets positively (negatively) about. It appears 
that this is already occurring through the use of computer algorithms that automatically trade off 
of President Trump’s tweets. In an interview with marketplace.org, Joe Gits explains that 
President Trump’s tweets are the target of some investment firms. Gits is the owner of Social 
Media Analytics, a company that collects potential market-moving social media data for 
investment firms. He explains that computer algorithms for some firms automatically make 
trades based on President Trump’s tweets within seconds of the tweets occurring. Automated 
trading explains instances such as the one graphed in the Introduction, where minute-over-
minute trading volume skyrocketed by 10,000% between the minute of President Trump’s tweet 
and the end of the next minute. Because of the existence of trading algorithms, say Gits,  “retail 
investors” – casual investors who aren’t associated with a career in stock trading – are left with 
much less opportunity to profit off of President Trump’s tweets, unless they act extremely 
quickly (Corban & Ryssdal, 2019). With this in mind, it appears that retail investors looking to 
achieve consistent profits off of President Trump’s tweets should exercise caution, as algorithms 
may complicate the process. 
Finally, this research could be valuable in making policy decisions for presidential social 
media behavior. President Trump’s company-specific tweets greatly increase volatility in the 
subjects of those tweets, lasting days, which is highly undesirable to owners of the company in 
question as well as the stock market in general. Additionally, if a president were to comprehend 
the specific power of his/her company specific tweets that is described in this paper, it could 
potentially be exploited; he/she could specifically tailor tweets to bargaining and political 
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advantage. For example, as leverage in negotiations with automotive companies to bring back 
jobs to the U.S., President Trump could threaten automotive companies with a series of negative 
tweets that could significantly impact their stock values. A president’s knowledge of his/her 
Twitter influence could also potentially lead to insider trading. For example, President Trump 
could tell a trusted colleague that he plans on tweeting something positive about a specific 
company at exactly 11:45 a.m., and that colleague could exploit the short-term abnormal returns 
of that company by buying its stock beforehand and holding onto it for the rest of the day. With 
these confounding factors in mind, policy should be considered to restrict the scope of a 
president’s company-specific tweets. 
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AR ATV Volatility
Ge et al.
0.006
***
0.331
*** 0.220
***
(0.002) (0.111) (0.095)
Replication
0.006
***
0.331
***
0.217
**
(0.002) (0.111) (0.098)
Table 1:  Replication
TW
TW
AR ATV Volatility
All Tweets
0.0025
**
0.192
*** 0.190
***
(0.0011) (0.038) (0.052)
Positive Only
0.0042
***
0.253
***
0.160
**
(0.0016) (0.054) (0.070)
Negative Only
-0.0009 0.131
**
0.218
***
(0.0015) (0.054) (0.077)
TW
TW
TW
Table 2: Full Sample Tests
Where *,**, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
“AR” stands for abnormal returns and “ATV” stands for abnormal trading 
volume. The numbers in parentheses represent panel-corrected standard 
errors. There are 57 companies spanning 790 days with the resulting number 
of panel observations totaling 44,052.  The full sample test includes 209 tweet 
events. The positive only test includes 103 tweet events. The negative only test 
includes 106 tweet events. 
Where *,**, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
“AR” stands for abnormal returns and “ATV” stands for abnormal trading volume. 
The numbers in parentheses represent panel-corrected standard errors. There 
are 19 companies spanning 181 days with the resulting number of panel 
observations totaling 3,439.  In these tests, there are 34 tweet events 
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AR ATV Volatility
Post Ge Et Al.
0.0047
**
0.199
*** 0.187
***
(0.0021) (0.039) (0.052)
-0.0032 0.095
**
0.007
(0.0024) (0.043) (0.058)
Post Inauguration
0.0070
**
0.198
*** 0.190
***
(0.0028) (0.038) (0.052)
-0.0054
*
0.087
**
-0.010
(0.0030) (0.041) (0.055)
TW
Interaction
Table 4: Interactions Effects
TW
Interaction
AR ATV Volatility
All Tweets
0.0026 0.254
*** 0.328
***
(0.0020) (0.070) (0.097)
Positive Only
0.0080
***
0.335
***
0.383
***
(0.0030) (0.106) (0.135)
Negative Only
0.0017 0.191
**
0.285
**
(0.0026) (0.094) (0.137)
Table 3: Intraday Tests
TW
TW
TW
Where *,**, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, 
respectively. “AR” stands for abnormal returns and “ATV” stands for 
abnormal trading volume. The numbers in parentheses represent panel-
corrected standard errors. There are 57 companies spanning 790 days with 
the resulting number of panel observations totaling 44,052. The full sample 
intraday test includes 64 tweet events. The positive only test includes 28 
tweet events. The negative only test includes 36 tweet events. 
Where *,**, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, 
respectively. “AR” stands for abnormal returns and “ATV” stands for 
abnormal trading volume. The numbers in parentheses represent panel-
corrected standard errors. There are 57 companies spanning 790 days with 
the resulting number of panel observations totaling 44,052.  The post Ge 
test includes 165 tweet events. The post inauguration test includes 186 
tweet events. 
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AR ATV Volatility
TW 0.0024
**
0.193
***
.0178
***
(0.0011) (0.038) (0.052)
TWt+1 0.0013 0.022 0.121
**
(0.0011) (0.038) (0.052)
TWt+2 0.0012 -0.050 -0.007
(0.0011) (0.039) (0.052)
TWt+3 -0.0006 0.033 0.182
***
(0.0011) (0.039) (0.052)
TWt+4 -.0006 0.018 0.113
**
(0.0011) (0.038) (0.052)
TWt+5 0.0010 -0.034 0.074
(0.0011) (0.038) (0.052)
Table 5: Lags of Twitter Variable
Where *,**, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, 
respectively. “AR” stands for abnormal returns and “ATV” stands for 
abnormal trading volume. The numbers in parentheses represent 
panel-corrected standard errors. There are 57 companies spanning 790 
days with the resulting number of panel observations totaling 44,052.  
Each TW variable consists of 209 tweet events. 
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AR ATV Volatility
TW 0.0023
**
0.176
***
0.172
***
(0.0011) (0.039) (0.053)
TWt-1 0.0030
***
0.168
***
0.124
**
(0.0011) (0.039) (0.053)
TWt-2 0.0011 0.066
*
0.097
*
(0.0011) (0.039) (0.053)
TWt-3 0.0005 -0.024 0.027
(0.0011) (0.039) (0.053)
TWt-4 -0.0003 -0.030 0.007
(0.0011) (0.039) (0.053)
TWt-5 0.0015 0.004 0.016
(0.0011) (0.039) (0.053)
Table 6: Testing for Prior News
Where *,**, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, 
respectively. “AR” stands for abnormal returns and “ATV” stands for 
abnormal trading volume. The numbers in parentheses represent 
panel-corrected standard errors. There are 57 companies spanning 790 
days with the resulting number of panel observations totaling 44,052.  
Each TW variable consists of 209 tweet events. 
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AR ATV Volatility
All Tweets
0.0024
***
0.061
** 0.130
***
(0.0008) (0.024) (0.033)
Positive Only
0.0025
**
0.093
***
0.074
(0.0011) (0.034) (0.047)
Negative Only
-0.0023
**
0.033 0.184
***
(0.0011) (0.033) (0.046)
TW
Table 7: Outlier Robust Regressions
TW
TW
AR ATV Volatility
0.0020
*
0.208
***
0.190
***
(0.0011) (0.035) (0.041)
Table 8: Two Way Fixed Effects
TW
Where *,**, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, 
respectively. “AR” stands for abnormal returns and “ATV” stands for 
abnormal trading volume. The numbers in parentheses represent panel-
corrected standard errors. There are 57 companies spanning 790 days with 
the resulting number of panel observations totaling 44,052.  In this test, 
there are 209 tweet events. 
Where *,**, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, 
respectively. “AR” stands for abnormal returns and “ATV” stands for 
abnormal trading volume. The numbers in parentheses represent panel-
corrected standard errors. There are 57 companies spanning 790 days with 
the resulting number of panel observations totaling 44,052.  In this test, 
there are 209 tweet events. 
